Není to tak dlouho, co jsem psal o tom, že se Pentagon chystá na velké koncepční změny [Pentagon goes hybrid (probably)], které by se měly ve formální podobě objevit příští rok v Quadrennial Defense Review. Samozřejmě jde o hybrid warfare, které začíná být na ministerstvu obrany podobně často používaným slovem jako counterinsurgency.
Jedním z hlavních tahounů formulace a prosazování tohoto konceptu do praxe je bývalá akademička Michèle A. Flournoy, nyní náměstkyně ministra obrany pro politiku, jinými slovy, „dvojka“ v Pentagonu. V sobotu o ní vyšel výborný profil v The New York Times: A Pentagon Trailblazer, Rethinking U.S. Defense. Mimo jiné se v něm praví:
Now one of the most senior officials at the Pentagon, with the title of under secretary of defense for policy, she holds the job considered the “brains” of the building. Her portfolio includes matters like Iraq and Afghanistan and pirates off the Horn of Africa, but her immediate task is the sweeping military strategy reassessment, called the Quadrennial Defense Review, which the Pentagon is required by Congress to produce every four years.
A zajímavé je, že oči jí otevřela Evropa, konkrétně, kdo by to řekl, Belgie:
Ms. Flournoy, who served in a lower-level Pentagon policy job in the Clinton administration and is sometimes mentioned as a years-from-now possibility as the first female defense secretary, said she began to make the transition from beach volleyball to throw weights when she spent a summer in Europe as a high school exchange student. “It was Belgium, of all places,” she said. “It was like opening up my eyes to the rest of the world.”
A právě Michèle Flournoy spolu se Shawnem Brimleyem (stratég z úřadu ministra obrany) napsala zajímavý textík do červencového čísla Proceedings Magazine, který vydává U.S. Naval Institute. Článek se jmenuje The Contested Commons a autoři v něm popisují hrozby, kterým budou Spojené státy a jejich spojenci čelit a návrhy na to, jak se s nimi vypořádat. Časopis námořnictva je správné místo k otištění takového textu. Ještě by jej nebylo od věci otisknout v časopisu letectva a pak ve všech tiskovinách vydávaných ozbrojenými silami spojenců z NATO.
Text je to poměrně krátký a snadno čitelný, a tedy i snadno pochopitelný. Spojené státy budou čelit třem výzvám:
First, as rising nations and non-state actors become more powerful, the United States will need to pay more attention to emerging risks associated with the global commons, those areas of the world beyond the control of any one state-sea, space, air, and cyberspace-that constitute the fabric or connective tissue of the international system. A series of recent events-including anti-satellite missile tests, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Africa, and attacks in cyberspace-highlight the need for the United States to work with its allies and partners to maintain relative peace and stability throughout the global commons.
Second, America’s continued advantages in traditional warfighting provide powerful incentives for our adversaries to employ a mix of traditional and irregular approaches that span the range of conflict. The 2007 Maritime Strategy was correct to conclude that modern wars are „increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.“ Defense Secretary Robert Gates has written that „one can expect a blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict . . . being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.“
Third, as trends ranging from the economic crisis to climate change and globalization continue to put pressure on the modern state system, the number of chronically weak or outright failing states will likely increase. For example, the same factors that may engender the rise of new great powers may also accelerate the decline of other states that-by virtue of poor leadership, economics, and/or geography-are unable to adapt to a new era and meet the basic needs of their populations. Conflict in the 21st century is at least as likely to result from problems associated with state weakness as from state strength.
A co z toho vyplývá pro USA a jejich spojence?
First, barriers to entry for both state and non-state actors to develop and field capabilities that can pose challenges to U.S. and allied freedom of action will lower substantially over time. The proliferation of knowledge and technology will allow an increasing number of state and non-state actors to deploy anti-access capabilities and high-end asymmetric technologies that can put allied infrastructure at risk and hamper U.S. power projection.
Second, rising powers will not likely be content to simply acquiesce to America’s role as uncontested guarantor of the global commons. Countries such as China, India, and Russia will demand a role in maintaining the international system in ways commensurate with their actual or perceived power and national interests. Such demands are already occurring, from declarations of interest in space capabilities, to indications that the Indian and Arctic oceans will become new global centers of gravity.
A jak nejisté budoucnosti čelit? Go hybrid. Jen kdyby to bylo tak snadné…