This is the second piece on International Conference titled “NATO Strategic Concept: Response to Our Concerns?” organized by Prague Security Studies Institute.

Symbol of NATO, Brussels; Photo by NATO

The North Atlantic area has been recently occupied by the discussions on the new strategic concept. The third major doctrinal document after the end of the Cold War could easily become both, a relevant strategic document setting reasonable framework for NATO’s future functioning or an irrelevant quasi-strategic exercise resulting from the political and diplomatic compromises based on general acceptance of idea that almost whatever phenomena should be responded by the mightiest world security (defense?) organization. The process based on national group of experts defining national priorities could be considered as fairly democratic, however strongly implies a danger of resulting in the latter possibility.

Following a formerly theoretical and conceptual debate the word “securitization” has become commonly used in the policy and political circles. Even more than that, it has become terribly proliferated and over-used. Today, almost every aspect of the social environment has a security dimension and every phenomenon might have security implications (are not, after all, animal laws connected with the food security…?). As an inevitable result the word has become to a large extent analytically empty. It is, however, even more important for our discussion that it has produced a large spectrum of topics burdening a debate on a reasonable strategic framework for NATO.

The so called new threats (energy security, cyber security, migration, climate security,…) emanating from the reasoning mentioned above have been currently considered as relevant topics for the new NATO strategic conception. There is no doubt these phenomena create security concerns and should be also addressed accordingly. The key question, however, is by whom or better through what institutional frameworks.

In fact, these decisions have already been done, although the political representations have not appeared to reflect upon it. The problems of migration, climate security, food security, etc. are dealt with in various more or less focused international organizations often starting with the EU and UN agencies. These bodies are generally intermittently successful; however they have a much better prospect to be more efficient than NATO. The reasons could be summarized as follows:

1. The impacts of the financial crisis will perhaps be greater than the politicians openly admit. This will create new tensions in already tensed defence budgets. New institutional capabilities (not to mention any other capabilities) are highly unrealistic within the NATO framework. The challenge for NATO will be to sustain current level of expeditionary missions;
2. The experience from Afghanistan might influence a future shape of NATO; without necessarily speculating how, we can presume that highly probably negatively;
3. The current international environment has provided a challenge in terms of achieving legitimacy for various actions. This pressure certainly influences also domestic political environment. For both reasons the functional expansion of NATO seems to be unrealistic.

Since the purpose of this comment is not only to offer a critique of political and strategic surrealism, I would suggest following three areas as substantial for the future NATO’s strategic framework.

1. Retention and sustainability of the nuclear deterrence capabilities with all implications related to the article five.
2. Evolution of functioning missile defence systems that, among other things, fit to NATO’s traditional hard security identity, second, provide protection against relevant threats, last but not least provide essential condition for future expeditionary mission when eliminating regional deterrence potentials.
3. Create a more effective framework for special and rapid reaction forces, which provide a realistic tool of the future NATO’s actions.

Although I am not entirely optimistic, I still believe the new NATO strategic framework will become more than a list of member states’ security concerns. It is apparently easier to survive a few uncertain critical years with a clear and realistic strategic vision.

Last week the Prague Security Studies Institute organized International Conference titled “NATO Strategic Concept: Response to Our Concerns?”. This piece is a first out of two reflecting some aspects of the conference.

Symbol of NATO, Brussels; Photo by NATO

The discussions about the new NATO strategic concept has reminded me summit of the NATO summit in Washington in 1999. The “war” summit was supposed to start the change of the alliance. In the following years the transformation should have taken place and even the crucial “identity” questions such “who are we”, “where are we heading to” etc. should have been addressed. Despite all of that a searching for the answers have been overshadowed by the self-interested dealing with internal rifts, and uncertainities about the sense of the alliance

Of course, the alliance has changed but, frankly, we have not moved as far as the member countries promised themselves on the summits in 1999 and 2002. When one of the speakers on the conference enumerated the successes of the alliance in the past 20 years, I could, rather bitterly and maybe unfairly, think only of one success: the alliance has somehow survived the end of the Cold War and the next two decades.

The introductory lines touch upon two major areas that have been discussed on the conference; the future of NATO connected with its reform that should be guarder by the new strategic concept (1), and the relations to Russia (2).

1) One of the speakers mentioned the motto of the 1990s: alliance must go out of the area or out of the business. Now it is time, he continued, for NATO to return into “the area”. While the alliance have focused on tackling the problems in the “outer area”, the credibility regarding its core task – defending the member countries – was severely hit by the events in Georgia in summer 2008.

I am not saying that the alliance would not be willing or able to defend its members. Rather, I would maintain that at least some members have lost the faith in it. We should still bear in mind that what matters is not what is true but what people think is a truth. The cases of Georgia crisis and looming problems in Afghanistan show that the alliance has not been missing will or means but rather trust and credibility. Some new members for example bitterly complain that NATO does not have the contingency plans which would “cover” the eastern part of the NATO’s territory.

2) The previous issue is connected with one of the main concerns of the conference – Russia. The impression is quite clear. No matter what we think about Russia in terms of considering her as a threat or in terms of dealing with her, she appears to be an omnipotent topic (not omnipotent power). Put it differently, whatever is the issue at stake, the debate ends with Russia; What would Russians think? What are they going to do?

This is exactly the case of putting the article 5 into doubts. What is behind the endeavours of some members to achieve new assurances about article 5? Are they afraid of Taliban, instability in Afghanistan, China or somebody else? No, it is all because of Russia.

Whereas the main threats officially emanate e.g. from Afghanistan (success or failure = existence or not existence of NATO), terrorism, failed states, rogues states with the WMDs, or from cyberspace, most of the Eastern countries see it differently. As oppose to the views of the main Western political representatives, the main threat to them has traditionally come from Russia. This issue has been causing tensions in NATO as well as in the EU.

The debate about Russia often slides to the problem of engagement. The conference included both harsh critics of Russia, who were sceptical about any possible relevant cooperation, as well as adherents of the closer and deeper engagement.

The engagement as such is an excellent idea. However, the problem is that the Russians accepts engagement only if they exercise a full control over the process. Read for example Russian advice on Afghanistan written by Boris Gromov and Dmitry Rogozin (Russian ambassador to NATO). They argue that Russia (USSR) was first defending the Western civilization against the Muslim fanatics and while the West is doing even worse mistakes, Russia is still willing to help. (Reading between the lines: like older and smarter brothers always do). If NATO will be willing to approach Russia as a more experienced brother, the engagement will work. Is it worth accepting? Russia will take part of the game only in case she is considered as the smartest and mightiest in the class. At the same time, she will shape the reality, rules, and, indeed, history according to her liking.

After all, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was not a shameful escape accompanied by the mujahadeen’s celebrations. The Soviet Army entered the country, accomplished its tasks — unlike the Americans in Vietnam — and returned to its motherland.

Indeed, Russia plays a bigger role in the discussions than it should play. The reason is obsession of Eastern member states of NATO by her. While it is to a certain extend understandable, majority of the old member states do not comprehend this and consider this obsession as exaggerated. I do not want to overdo this “cleavage” but the distrust within the alliance is much more dangerous then the potential failure in Afghanistan.

Several steps might easily improve the internal situation without necessarily complicating the relations with Russia. NATO could, for example, increase the number of instalments in the new member countries, organize exercises within the current NATO borders, and prepare contingency plans while keeping transparent and opened communication channels with Russia. The point is that the alliance must not play the game according to the Russian’s rules.

The alliances do not need their enemies. They exist until they serve the interests of their members. What are these interests nowadays and how NATO can address them? These two questions should be clearly answered in the new strategic concept. Trying to satisfy everyone in the new strategy would be a mistake. Alliance is not and cannot be the right tool for everything, nor it is the only tool. We should not seek maximum, we should seek the least common denominator. Since the very beginning of NATO it has been the territorial defence of members. Let us return and start out strategy from there.