Je to naprosto bizarní zpráva, ale už jen proto si zaslouží, aby byla zaznamenána. Manuál britského ministerstva obrany o tom, jak bránit únikům informací unikl na internet. Má 2389 stránek, je označen jako „vyhrazený“ a najdete ho na stránce wikileaks.org. Když se člověk pročítá některými pasážemi má pocit, že sleduje společnou hru Monty Pythonů a aktérů Ano, pane ministře. Snaha úředníků o definice je k popukání:

Leaks usually take the form of reports in the public media which appear to involve the unauthorised disclosure of official information (whether protectively marked or not) that causes political harm or embarrassment to either the UK Government or the Department concerned. Such disclosure may have been made either orally, whether deliberately or carelessly, or following the unauthorised sight or passage of a document. Information that is formally reported as lost to a security authority, and subsequently appears in the public media, should not be treated as a leak but judged to be a compromise of lost information and treated as a loss. First news of a leak may come direct from a journalist attempting either to verify the information obtained or wishing the Department or agency to know what access to official information has been gained. In the rare cases where this occurs prior to publication, it may be possible to seek an injunction to prevent publication.

The Daily Telegraph k tomu poznamenává:

It comes as the latest figures show almost 700 MoD laptops and 200 memory sticks have been lost or stolen in the past four years with the most recent containing personal details of 600,000 military recruits. The manual warned of “disaffected staff” leaking information to journalists or information getting out “simply by accident or carelessness“.

A ještě jedna věc je na uniklém dokumentu hodně zajímavá. Silně varuje před čínskou špionáží:

3. Chinese intelligence activity is widespread and has a voracious appetite for all kinds of information; political, military,commercial, scientific and technical. It is on this area that the Chinese place their highest priority and where we assess that the greatest risk lies. 4. The Chinese have realised that it is not productive to simply steal technology and then try to `reverse engineer it‘. Through intelligence activity they now attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of production te chniques and methodologies.

A nakonec charakteristika čínských zpravodajských metod, především to, že zatím nejsou popsány v beletriii:

6. Chinese intelligence activity is very different to the portrayal of `Moscow Rules‘ in the novels of John Le Carre. The Chinese make no distinction between `information‘ and `intelligence‘. Their appetite for information, particularly in the scientific and technical field, is vast and indiscriminate. They do not `run agents‘ <AD> they `make friends‘. Although there are Chinese `intelligence officers‘, both civilian and military, these fade into insignificance behind the mass of ordinary students, businessmen and locally employed staff who are working (at least part-time) on the orders of various parts of the S tate intelligence gathering apparatus.